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Recent theoretical models suggest that the costs governments face when defaulting on 
their domestic and external debt may differ considerably. This paper examines if this pro-
posed cost difference is reflected in sovereign risk spreads across domestic and foreign 
markets. Specifically, I analyze market yields on Danish government debt in both Den-
mark and Sweden during 1938–1948, i.e., a period full of political shocks as well as a war-
time segmentation of Scandinavian capital markets. By linking the exogenous wartime 
shocks to changes in the costs of defaulting on domestic and external sovereign debt, it is 
found that these costs explain a significant part of the variation in the sovereign risk spread 
across markets. The result is robust to a multitude of tests and the inclusion of additional 
yield spread influences such as differences in macroeconomic fluctuations, portfolio allo-
cation opportunities, local risk aversion and microstructure institutions. 
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1  Introduction 
Domestically issued domestic-currency government debt has become a major source of 
public finance for many emerging market economies over the last years (Reinhart et al., 
2003, Table 14). Despite this development, standard models of sovereign debt only focus 
on external government debt, issued in foreign currency to a foreign market, when assess-
ing the costs of default, e.g., deteriorated credit reputation on international capital markets 
(Eaton and Gersovitz, 1982; Kletzer and Wright, 2000), risk of triggering various forms of 
direct sanctions (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a,b) and curbed trade flows (Rose, 2005).  
 
In a more recent sovereign debt default literature, however, researchers argue that the costs 
of domestic defaults are both quantitatively as important as the costs of external debt de-
faults and different in their nature. Specifically, Drazen (1998) and Di Gioacchino et al. 
(2005) characterize domestic creditors as belonging to the constituency upon which the 
government relies for its political support. Unlike external debt holders, domestic debt 
holders are thereby able to credibly threaten to punish sovereigns in case of a domestic 
default by refusing re-election. Similarly, Gelpern and Setser (2004) argue that local elites 
represent another group of large domestic government bondholders and they may be ex-
pected to exert all their influence to prevent the government from repudiating its domestic 
debt, possibly pushing it to instead repudiate its foreign loans.
1 Taken together, these 
models can be seen as complementing the traditional models cited above, their main mes-
sage being that if the groups holding domestic and external debt, and their means to punish 
a defaulting sovereign, differ the expected costs of domestic and external defaults will 
most likely also differ. 
 
Past empirical studies of sovereign defaults have primarily focused on countries’ external 
government debt, some examining the explanatory power of the standard models (e.g., 
Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003; Rose, 2005; Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2005) while others 
have searched for additional institutional or political factors to either explain changes in 
market-based risk assessment of external debt (e.g., Mauro et al., 2003; Hilscher and Nos-
busch, 2004) or the incidence of actual external debt defaults (Kohlscheen, 2003; Bordo 
                                                 
1 Furthermore, Reinhart et al. (2003) argue that another cost of a domestic default is the possibly resulting 
turbulence on domestic banking markets, which could hurt government finances (Reinhart et al., 2003). 
Roubini (2001) emphasizes moral and equity reasons for discriminating between domestic and external de-
faults.   3
and Oosterlinck, 2005). In Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2004), however, the default like-
lihoods of both domestic and external debt are investigated. They find a variation in the 
degree of influence from a collection of political institutional variables (e.g., democracy 
vs. dictatorship, parliamentary vs. presidential electoral systems), but primarily that they 
only bind in conjunction with severe macroeconomic stability (e.g., low levels of infla-
tion). Tomz (2004) studies how individual voter preferences correspond to the expected 
distributional effects of a domestic debt default, finding that they are well in line with the 
“political default cost”-channel proposed by the model of Drazen (1998).  
 
This paper examines how changes in the expected costs of defaulting on domestic and ex-
ternal debt influence the spread in sovereign risk between domestic and foreign markets. 
To my knowledge, this is the first time such an analysis is conducted. The study rests on a 
unique historical episode, World War II, when a series of exogenous political shocks both 
shifted the relative cost of domestic and external defaults and abruptly segmented interna-
tional capital markets. While the exogeneity of the cost shocks is important for the inter-
pretation of the measured effects, capital market segmentation is necessary for being able 
to contrast the different theories on external and domestic default costs, as it ensures a sta-
ble linkage between creditor nationality and debt type with no arbitrage trading or debt 
buybacks by borrowing governments. The empirical analysis uses newly assembled mar-
ket yields on Danish government bonds traded on Danish and Swedish markets during 
1938–1948 to calculate a Danish “sovereign risk spread” over debt types. This is done by 
separating out all non-risk related yield influences on the spread, such as market differ-
ences in macroeconomic fluctuations, portfolio diversification opportunities, risk aversion 
and market microstructure regulations. The resulting sovereign risk spread is regressed on 
the exogenous variable containing the wartime shocks that, arguably, significantly influ-
enced the costs of defaulting on the domestic and external debt that the Danish govern-
ment expected to bear.
2  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional settings in the Danish 
and Swedish secondary bond markets, including details on pricing, trading and regulatory 
changes in the study period. Section 3 presents the basic empirical methodology and Sec-
                                                 
2 There were trading halts on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange in September 1939 and April-May 1940, but 
Danish financial newspapers reported the bond quotes on the curb market which were regarded as represen-
tative (see section 2). Moreover, the analysis in section 6 shows that the impact on government yields of 
these circuit breakers was marginal.   4
tion 4 discusses the data. In Section 5, the main results along with a robustness analysis 
are presented. Section 6 concludes. 
2  Institutional setting 
This section outlines the institutional framework of the Danish and Swedish secondary 
government bond markets in the late 1930’s and 1940’s. The main messages are the fol-
lowing. First, these markets basically functioned freely throughout this period, despite the 
wartime regulations that were particularly experienced by the Copenhagen Stock Ex-
change. Second, the amount of trading in Danish government bonds in both markets was 
sufficiently large to assert that there were sufficient levels of market liquidity in these 
loans. Third, the degree of Danish-Swedish capital market integration varied considerably 
during the period. During the interwar period, both markets were fully integrated with 
each other, but the outbreak of World War II and capital controls imposed by both coun-
tries shortly thereafter abruptly put a halt to this and instead completely segmented the 
markets. This implies that during the war, only domestic (Danish) investors were allowed 
to trade Danish domestic debt in Denmark and only foreign (Swedish) investors were al-
lowed to trade Danish external debt in Sweden. 
 
Table 1 presents details on the size and activity of the Danish and Swedish bond markets 
as well as some specific regulatory changes concerning the pricing of bonds. The Copen-
hagen market was considerably larger than that in Stockholm, listing more bond loans and 
reporting an overall larger traded volume. In particular, a large trading volume is impor-
tant for there to be enough market liquidity and, in turn, roughly efficient prices (Silber, 
1991; Longstaff, 2005). Judging from the statistics of the exchange-based turnover and 
estimates of the trading in the Swedish over the counter (OTC) market, which is a tradi-
tionally important venue for bond trading, the amounts traded were significant in both 
countries and, in particular, in the individual government bonds analyzed in this study.  
 
Most market microstructure regulations were the same in Copenhagen and Stockholm dur-
ing most of the period. As shown in Table 1, a major exception was the practice of circuit 
breakers, mainly in Copenhagen. These included two trading halts, the first between Sep-
tember 1 and 10, 1939 and the second between April 9 and May 22, 1940. More impor-
tantly, price limits were imposed on bonds after the outbreak of the war. Between Septem-
ber 1 and 22, 1939, the prices of bonds (and stocks) were prohibited to move two percent-  5
age points under their prewar (August 30) closing price. Between September 23, 1939 and 
February 23, 1946, the price limits were relaxed to restrict daily price falls beyond one 
percentage point.
3 The Stockholm market also practiced price limits during this period, but 
only at the beginning of the war (September–December 1939) and with much wider bands 
of the allowed price changes (beyond five, and often more, percentage points). Hence, the 
Stockholm limits were much less restrictive than those in Copenhagen and from historical 
sources, they only seem to have been binding on a few occasions.
4  
 
The degree of capital market integration between Denmark and Sweden varied dramati-
cally in the study period. From being fully integrated during the interwar era, capital con-
trols imposed by the governments in both countries effectively stopped almost all cross-
border capital flows between these two and all other Western countries.
5 This development 
is depicted in Figure 1. That the wartime segmentation of Danish and Swedish capital 
markets was not overridden by some third-country market is also indicated in Figure 1 by 
the instantaneous drops in the capital flows to and from both Great Britain and the United 
States.  
 
The primary market supply of Danish domestic and external government debt may influ-
ence secondary market yields. According to standard asset pricing theory, an increased 
supply increases the government’s debt service load on fiscal inflows which, all else equal, 
increases the sovereign risk. An increased supply also pushes the secondary market prices 
of government bonds down or, equivalently, the yields on government bonds up. In other 
words, increasing the relative stock of domestic to external debt hence decreases the sov-
ereign yield spread, if the latter is beforehand perceived as more risky than the former.
6 
Historically, the Danish government issued four new domestic and no new foreign loans 
during 1939–1945.
7 Accordingly, the isolated primary market effects on Danish sovereign 
                                                 
3 On all these events, see the Danish financial weekly Finanstidende Sep. 6, 1939, p. 1020; Sep. 27, 1939, p. 
1077 and Feb. 27, 1946, p. 430. 
4 Algott (1963, pp. 182ff) argues that the stock exchange board generally accepted daily price drops well 
beyond the official limit of five percentage points, especially for foreign-issued bonds. The period when the 
limits are said to have been the most restrictive is December 1939 and then mainly Finnish government 
bonds were concerned. 
5 Although the capital controls were not imposed until January 1940 (see Table 1), the drop in recorded 
cross-border flows to and from Sweden (Figure 1) was observed already in the last quarter of 1939. During 
that period, the flows were only 1.8 percent (outflows) and 3.8 percent (inflows) of the levels in the fourth 
quarter of 1938. 
6 The empirical literature contains ample evidence on a positive relation between debt to GDP and sovereign 
yield spreads (see, e.g., Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2004). 
7 Statistics Denmark (1969), pp. 205–206.   6
yields should have been positive (i.e., yield-increasing) in the case of domestic debt and 
unchanged in the case of external debt.  
 
Politically motivated interventions in government bond markets represent another poten-
tial source of distortions of observed market returns. The most obvious case would be the 
government commanding the Danish central bank Nationalbanken to purchase govern-
ment debt, whenever its price was falling more than what is wanted. Taking stock with the 
available statistical and anecdotal evidence, however, such non-market interference was 
infrequent and, in any case, not effective in the long run. The Danish bonds held by Na-
tionalbanken only increased marginally between June and December 1939, and even de-
creased during the most critical period, December 1939 and June 1940 (Svendsen, 1968, p. 
16). Furthermore, the monetary policy issues addressed by Nationalbanken itself in the 
early war years rather concerned how to prevent interest rates from falling too much in the 
light of the abundant liquidity levels in the Danish economy.
8 In other words, the Danish 
central bank worked to raise, not reduce, market interest rates during the war period. 
3  Estimation methodology 
The estimation approach is based on relating differences in sovereign risk between domes-
tic and foreign markets with changes in the relative cost of defaulting on domestic versus 
external debt. For this purpose, one needs to separate out all influences on observed sover-
eign yield spreads, both nominal and real, that are not associated with default risk, e.g., 
macroeconomic fluctuations (expected depreciation and inflation differential), portfolio 
allocation (market interest rate and stock market return differentials) and differences in 
institutional market microstructure constraints.
9 Specifically, the variables of interest are: 
 
Macroeconomic fluctuations: I use a set of parity relationships from international econom-
ics to define the influence from expected exchange rate depreciation (on nominal yield 
spreads) and expected inflation rate differences (on real spreads). The uncovered interest 
rate parity (UIP) states that nominal yields should be equal across markets, once expected 
depreciation is controlled for. The real interest rate parity (RIP) states that real yields 
                                                 
8 In fact, new treasuries and long-term government bond loans were issued and higher cash reserve ratios for 
the banking system were imposed (Johansen, 1986, pp. 87–90; Hoffmeyer, 1968, pp. 229–231, 240–249). 
9 All identical yield determinants across debt types and markets, such as the term premium in this paper, 
cancel out entirely.   7
should equalize across markets (at least in the “long run”).
10 While the concepts are admit-
tedly stylized, they are widely used in studies of market integration and interest rate differ-
entials as benchmarks for understanding the role of macroeconomic factors on these issues 
(see, e.g., Jackson and Lothian, 1993; Lothian, 2001; Lothian and Wu, 2005).  
 
Portfolio allocation factors: The cost of holding fixed-income securities depends on the 
fluctuations in market interest rates (the interest rate risk) and the return on other invest-
ments in the market (Cuthbertson, 1996, ch. 9). These influences are accounted for by in-
cluding market differentials for the market interest rate and stock market return. 
  
Institutional differences: Changes in market microstructure constraints, e.g., price limits 
and trading halts (Charemza and Majerowska, 2000) and illiquidity (Silber, 1991; Long-
staff, 2005), can have sizeable effects on recorded asset returns. Section 2 showed that 
most bond market institutions (e.g., taxes on cash flows, commission fees and market li-
quidity) were either the same in Denmark and Sweden or did not change during the study 
period, implying that they enter as constants in the empirical estimations. As for the circuit 
breakers in Copenhagen, a separate analysis in Section 5.1 shows that they had no lasting 
effect on sovereign spreads. 
 
Costs of defaulting on domestic and external government debt: The introduction discussed 
two literatures on sovereign debt default, one exclusively focusing on the external default 
costs of deteriorated international credit reputation (e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz, 1982; Klet-
zer and Wright, 2000), direct sanctions (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a,b) or curbed trade flows 
(Rose, 2005), and another that specified domestic default costs, mainly in the form of po-
litical punishments by deprived domestic creditors also being voter groups (Drazen, 1998; 
Di Gioacchino et al., 2005) or local special interests (Gelpern and Setser, 2004). In order 
to analyze whether these costs really influenced the market-assessed sovereign risk spread 
between Danish external and domestic debt during World War II, I use the fact that they 
shifted significantly, to different degrees, following some of the major political wartime 
shocks hitting Denmark and the Danish government. Specifically, by applying the theo-
retical sovereign debt models to the political and economic history of Denmark I deduct 
                                                 
10 The RIP result draws on a combination of UIP and the relative purchasing power parity (PPP), which 
states that expected depreciation should correspond to the differences in expected inflation.   8
the shift in the relative cost of defaulting on domestic versus external debt following each 
of these severe shocks.
11  
 
Table 2 displays the result of this theory- and history-based classification. During the ini-
tial pre-war period, Denmark faced high default costs on all debt types. External default 
costs were high, since Denmark had a default-free credit history and hence, potentially 
high reputational costs in terms of more expensive future borrowing. Domestic costs were 
also high, since bondholding was widespread among the Danish people and, accordingly, 
the creditors were likely to be a large part of the government’s constituency.
12 The first 
severe political shock came with the outbreak of World War II, when external default 
costs were reduced for two reasons. First, the reputational costs of a default are likely to be 
smaller if the default is driven by exogenous fiscal shocks, as during wars, and not purely 
by the will of sovereigns. Second, historians report that the Danish government disliked 
the fact that in early 1940, the Swedish government refused to promise to support of Den-
mark in case of an attack (Lidegaard, 2005, p. 150). The domestic default costs remained 
high, however, since the economic difficulties caused by the war made the Danish people 




The German occupation on April 9, 1940 profoundly changed the Danish political situa-
tion. Although the Danish government remained in charge of most fiscal and political is-
sues, the Germans taxed the country heavily and took over the residual control of the 
country. However, historians emphasize that the Germans were keen on keeping the Dan-
ish people reasonably satisfied in order to prevent any disruptions in the important Danish-
German trade and keep occupation costs low (Johansen, 1986, p. 72). Taken together, this 
                                                 
11 The periodization largely relies on the historical descriptions of Johansen (1968, ch. 4–6) and Lidegaard 
(2005). Oosterlinck and Landon-Lane (2006) study how the effect of political shocks during World War I 
affected Russian government bond price differentials, but they use a different definition of shocks (deriving 
them from the time-series properties and not theoretical sovereign debt models) and focus on other questions 
than the ones focusing on costs of domestic and external default. 
12 All Danish loans issued in Sweden in the 1930’s were fully subscribed, but not without problems. A 
Swedish commentator said about the 1936 loan that it was “over-subscribed to a surprisingly large degree 
considering the risk associated with the Danish economic and political affairs. (...) The underwriters did, 
however, recognize these risks by setting the effective interest rate significantly higher than would have been 
the case for an equivalent loan by Finland or Norway” (Affärsvärlden, May 14, 1936, p. 500) [own transla-
tion]. Interestingly, this skepticism was not present when the 1938 loan was overtaken at par (Affärsvärlden, 
Nov 10, 1938, p. 1188). 
13 See, e.g., Johansen (1986, p. 72) and Finanstidende Mar. 13, 1940, pp. 484f. See also the analysis by 
Waldenström and Frey (2006) of pre-war threat assessments in the Nordic countries during 1938–1940, 
which supports the notion of the war outbreak and the German occupation as large political shocks.   9
suggests that domestic default costs remained high. The Swedish creditors felt considera-
bly more worried with a notorious defaulter occupying Denmark, and contemporaries 
seem to have expected at least a partial default triggered by the Germans.
14 The third po-
litical shock was when in August 29, 1943, the Germans dissolved the Danish govern-
ment, proclaimed martial law and took control over most political and fiscal issues 
(Johansen, 1986, p. 87). If anything, this must have reduced the punishment ability of the 
Danish people vis-à-vis the German occupants, hence reducing the domestic default costs. 
However, the external default costs hardly changed after this and remained at their low 
level. Finally, the peace in May 1945 brought back the Danish debt servicing policy to the 
pre-war situation, evidenced by a new Danish loan placed in Sweden in 1947 (see the in-
creased Swedish capital export to Denmark that year in Figure 1). 
 
Adding up, the estimation using nominal yield spreads and hence, the UIP framework is:  
 
 NomSpreadED,t = β0 + β1ExpDeprt + β2NomIntDifft + β3NomMarkDifft + δjTj + et, ,  (1) 
 
where NomSpreadED,t denotes the spread between secondary market yields on nominal ex-
ternal (E) and domestic (D) debt at time t,
15 ExpDeprt is the ex post forward rate of ex-
change rate depreciation, NomIntDifft is the difference between short-run interest rates on 
foreign and domestic markets, NomMarkDifft is the equivalent difference between the re-
turn on stock market portfolios, and Tj are the dummy variables capturing the impact of 
the changes in relative default risk described above and in Table 2. The equivalent equa-
tion using real yield spreads and the RIP framework is  
 
  RealSpreadED,t = γ0 + γ1RealIntDifft + γ2RealMarkDifft + δjTj + et, (2) 
 
where RealSpreadED,t, RealIntDifft and RealMarkDifft are the real variants of the market 
differentials defined above, with details on the variables described in Section 4. Both Eq. 
(1) and (2) are estimated with OLS, using Newey and West (1987) standard errors to con-
trol for the potential serial correlation in the residuals caused by overlapping observations 
of the ex post forward rates. 
                                                 
14 Affärsvärlden May 4, 1940, p. 396. 
15 The UIP is commonly tested as st+n – st = α + δ(SPREADDE) + εt (see, e.g., Lothian and Wu, 2005; Chinn, 
2005), with a predicted δ of unity. Since this study defines the spread as SPREADED and puts it on the left-
hand side, the predicted UIP-coefficient is negative.   10
4  Data 
The main bond data used are yields to maturity calculated from end-of-month bid prices of 
Danish long-run government bonds issued in Denmark and Sweden and traded at the Co-
penhagen and Stockholm Stock Exchanges during 1938–1948.
16 Since Eq.’s (1) and (2) 
are based on cancelling out all non-risk factors explaining the Danish yield spreads across 
markets, I selected the Danish government bonds from each market with a similar features 
as possible. These are: from Copenhagen, the 4% 25-year loan of 1934 issued in Danish 
kronor, and from Strockholm, the 4% 20-year loan of 1936 issued in Swedish kronor. The 
coupons for both these loans were paid semiannually and their nominal yields are depicted 
in Figure 2.
17 As noted by Statistics Denmark (1967, p. 226), the 1934 loan was prema-
turely redeemed in July 1950 but I have not found any indications or announcements of 
this in the financial chronicle Finanstidende in the years preceding the event and hence, 
disregard this early call in the yield calculations. Available official documentation and fi-
nancial press in both countries suggest that all bondholders, both home and abroad, re-
ceived coupon payments throughout the period.
18  
 
A complementary dataset for analyzing the impact of the price limits and trading halts 
practiced in Copenhagen was collected on a daily basis from the newspaper Berlingske 
Tidende for the period July 1, 1939–June 30, 1940, i.e., the period of the most important 
microstructure shocks. The data cover daily prices and volumes for three different kinds of 
bonds: one government bond (issued in 1934, see above) and two 4% bonds issued by the 
local credit associations in Copenhagen and Østifterne.
19  
 
Data on market interest rates are based on the official central bank discount rates from 
both countries. Nominal market portfolio returns are monthly stock market capital gains 
                                                 
16 Prices come from Statistical Yearbook of Denmark (table Københavns Børskurs (Køber) for Obligationer) 
and the Swedish financial chronicle Affärsvärlden. During the closure of the Copenhagen exchange in April-
May 1940, prices came from the OTC market (Finanstidende 22 May 1940, p. 700). 
17 I also checked the results using other yield concepts (current yield, yield to average life) and bonds (Co-
penhagen: 3.5% consol of 1888; Stockholm: 3.5% 20-year loan of 1938) without finding any notable effect 
on the results. 
18 For Sweden, the Bond Catalogues of the Swedish Banker’s Association as well as Affärsvärlden were 
closely searched for any information about halted or stopped debt service. But as reported by the Danish 
newspaper Finanstidende in the mid-1940, the Danish government indeed sustained its debt service to for-
eign creditors unlike what could be expected (Finanstidende 12 Jun. 1940, p. 761). 
19 These two loans were selected as they were described as the most “popular” among Danish investors and 
hence, an upper bound on trading volumes. In the bond lists, they were denoted as follows: Kjøbenhavns 
Kreditforening (1933–2007, 9 S.) and Østifternes Kreditforening (1934–2009, 14 S.)    11
with real returns calculated by deflating these returns with monthly inflation (see below). 
These two variables are shown in Figure 3.  
 
Expected depreciation is calculated as follows. Let st be the log exchange rate of Swedish 
currency units per unit of Danish currency (based on daily buy and sell spot rates from 
Bank of Sweden’s Annual Reports) and s
e
t+n the expected depreciation over n months at 
month t. The ex post forward rate of expected depreciation is defined as st+n = s
e
t+n + εt, 
where st+n is the actual log exchange rate at period t + n and εt a random error (assuming 
rational expectations). 
 
Expected inflation rates are based on monthly cost of living indices, CLI, for Denmark 
(Statistics Denmark) and Sweden (Statistics Sweden), with the expected annual inflation 
rate over the coming n months being πt+n = [(CLIt+n – CLIt)/CLIt]
12/n, where the ratio in the 
exponent annualizes the inflation rate. While most studies set n = 12 to get a straightfor-
ward measure of annual inflation expectation, the bond yields assume that bond are held 
until they mature (as in “yield to maturity”), implying a much larger n. To avoid meas-
urement problems, I use both n = 12 and n = [120, 252], corresponding to the period 
1938–1948 during which n descended from 252 (21 years) to 120 (10 years) (see Figure 
4). The ex post rate of the expected inflation difference between markets for debt types E 




D,t+n) + εt. 
Using changes in CLI as an inflation proxy may be problematic, since both Denmark and 
Sweden practiced commodity price controls for most of the wartime period. But replacing 
the CLI with a nominal stock market index, which is arguably better for capturing espe-
cially high levels of “true” inflation, does not cause any significant differences in the main 
findings of the study.  
5  Empirical results 
Table 3 displays the results from the estimations using nominal (Eq. 1) and real (Eq. 2) 
sovereign spreads. The main finding is that the spread between Danish external and do-
mestic government yields responded significantly to the default cost shocks displayed in 
Table 2 and, importantly, in a way consistent with the predictions of the domestic default 
cost models of Drazen (1998) and others. In particular, the outbreak of World War II sig-
nificantly increased sovereign risk spreads from pre-war levels by between 250 and 370 
basis points (T(War)), depending on the specification. This effect is in line with the reduc-  12
tion of the relative external default cost as explained in Section 4 and Table 2. The second 
severe political shock was the German invasion of Denmark in April 1940, which was fol-
lowed by three years of German occupation. As stated in Table 2, the domestic political 
situation was largely unchanged and domestic default costs hence remained high. By con-
trast, expected external default costs dropped further as a result of the new political and 
fiscal influence of the notorious defaulter Germany. Fully in line with this prediction, the 
estimated change in sovereign risk spread, i.e., T(Occupation) – T(War), showed an in-
crease by between 150 and 340 basis points. 
 
The third wartime shock to relative sovereign default costs was when Germany dissolved 
the Danish government and proclaimed martial law in late August 1943. According to Ta-
ble 2, this event reduced domestic default costs, while it did not affect the already low ex-
ternal default costs. Hence, the relative cost of a domestic default decreased, which is pre-
cisely what the point estimate T(Martial) – T(Occupation) indicates, namely a decrease in 
sovereign risk spread by 270–370 basis points. The last wartime shock according to Table 
2 was the end of the war in May 1945, which basically restored Danish pre-war debt ser-
vicing policies and thereby, roughly equalized expected default costs across debt types. 
The estimates in Table 3 fully reinforce this picture by reporting a decrease in the sover-
eign risk spread, T(Martial) – T(Peace), by between 260 and 360 basis points. This drop 
eliminated the remaining wartime spread and hence, supports the theoretical and historical 
predictions of Table 2. 
 
As for the sovereign spread-effect from expected depreciation ExpDepr, it turns out to 
have a negative sign, which is in accordance with the predictions of UIP.
20 Furthermore, 
the regression constants are all small and, expect in one case, insignificantly different from 
zero. This mainly signals that the sovereign spread was actually zero, as expected, during 
the periods of full market integration. In the case of the real spread estimations, moreover, 
the zero intercept provides support for the theoretical predictions of RIP. As for market 
interest rate differentials, they are positively related to the real spreads estimations and 
largely insignificant (though with a positive sign) in the case of the nominal spread. The 
difference between market portfolio returns, finally, seems to have no effect at all on gov-
                                                 
20 This confirms the basic findings of Lothian and Wu (2005) who show that UIP is typically rejected over 
relatively short time horizons but is increasingly accepted the longer the time horizons get. Most holding 
periods of this study are relatively long term.   13
ernment bond spreads. While somewhat surprising, this may simply reflect the relatively 
high variation in market returns as indicated in Figure 3. 
5.1  Robustness check I: Controlling for microstructure differences 
If the wartime bond price limits on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (see Section 2) were 
binding, they might have had an own effect on the sovereign yield spreads. To examine 
whether this was the case, I analyze the daily price movements and trading volumes of 
three individual bond loans, one issued by the government (Figure 5a) and two issued by 
local credit associations (Figures 5b and 5c) that were traded in Copenhagen between July 
1939 and June 1940 (see further Section 4). Under the second price limit regime starting 
on September 23, 1939, when daily falls beyond one percentage point were prohibited, the 
expected effect of a large negative shock to bond values would be that trading disappeared 
instantly and bond prices gradually adjusted at the maximum allowed rate, until they 
reached a level at which trading returned. However, this is not at all what is shown in the 
data. Except the first three weeks in September, when a price floor made trading vanish 
entirely, the only instance at which price limits seem to have been binding was the four 
consecutive days after the change of price limit regime, September 23–26. During these 
four days, prices of all the examined bonds fell by one percentage point and no trades were 
recorded. After that, however, trading resumed and prices began fluctuating both up and 
down. In fact, for the rest of the period, the data in Figures 5a-c clearly suggest lively trad-
ing and seemingly free pricing, which is also indicated by contemporary sources.
21 In 
other words, this analysis shows that the wartime price limits in Copenhagen had little sig-
nificant effect on recorded price levels, and hence yields, of either government or non-
government Danish bonds traded in secondary markets.  
5.2  Robustness check II: Controlling for risk aversion 
Another explanation for large sovereign spreads that does not involve default risk differen-
tials is changes in risk aversion among different groups of investors. This explanation was 
proposed by Roubini (2001) after observing the recent spikes in sovereign spreads (over 
the U.S. yield) for countries with default-free histories and otherwise well-behaved fun-
damentals. I evaluate this alternative hypothesis by estimating risk premiums of the inves-
tors on both domestic (Danish) and foreign (Swedish) markets using different variants of a 
                                                 
21 Contemporary sources confirm this picture, i.e., that volumes vanished during the initial price limit regime 
(see Finanstidende 20 Sep. 1939, p. 1058; Obligationstidende 27 Sep. 1939) and that they returned after the 
limits were relaxed to constrain daily fluctuations (Obligationstidende 5 Jun. 1940, p. 17).   14
single-asset time series CAPM. Since government bonds are not often treated as the risky 
asset in CAPM, I employ two concepts of bond returns to avoid any measurement prob-
lems: monthly yields and monthly holding period returns.
22 The wartime segmentation of 
Scandinavian bond markets necessitates the use of two different types of market portfo-
lios. When markets were segmented, I use a local stock market portfolio which means es-
timating a standard CAPM. When markets were integrated, however, I calculate a “Scan-
dinavian” stock market portfolio using equal weights for the Copenhagen and Stockholm 
market, and fit an international CAPM following Karolyi and Stulz (2003). Returns are 
throughout converted into home currencies, i.e., DKK (SEK) for Danish (Swedish) inves-
tors: 
 
  zt = αk + z
L
t βk + νt,    k = Full, Prewar, War, Postwar,  (3) 
 
  zt = αk + z
S
t βk + νt,    k = Full, Prewar, War, Postwar,  (4) 
 




t – rt the excess 




t – rt the excess Scandinavian market return, αk con-
stants, βk beta for periods k = “Full” (1938:1–1948:12), “Prewar” (1938:1–1939:8), “War” 
(1939:9–1945:5) and “Postwar” (1945:6–1948:12) and νt a random error. The sample sizes 
are arguably small and to handle this, I use bootstrapped standard errors with 2000 replica-
tions for each sub-period. Moreover, outliers cause heteroskedastic and non-normal re-
siduals, and to account for this, I fit robust CAPM regressions throughout.
23 Finally, it 
should be noted that single-asset CAPM regressions are inherently noisy, and the overall 
goodness of fit is therefore expected to be relatively low. 
 
The results in Table 4 clearly show that the variation in the estimated betas across time 
periods and countries is small, with the Danish betas being slightly larger than the Swedish 
ones. In other words, the recorded asset returns do not indicate any spikes in risk aversion 
among either Danish or Swedish investors during this time period, hence rejecting 
Roubini’s (2001) alternative explanation. The result holds across all specifications of the 
                                                 
22 Monthly holding period returns, ht = (Ct + Pt – Pt–1)/Pt–1 for monthly accrued coupon Ct and bond price Pt, 
may better correspond to stock returns. 
23 Robust regressions basically eliminate gross outliers by computing Huber-biweight iterations that allow 
observations to be weighted more evenly in the loss function.   15
CAPM model (“Local” or “Scandinavian”) and the concept of bond returns (yield or hold-
ing period return). 
6  Concluding remarks 
This paper examines how sovereign risk depends on the location of trade and the national-
ity of investors, as suggested by a recent strand of sovereign debt research. Specifically, I 
analyze market yields on Danish government debt, continuously traded in Denmark and 
Sweden during 1938–1948, a period full of political shocks and also a wartime segmenta-
tion of capital markets in Scandinavia. By linking the exogenous wartime shocks to 
changes in the costs of domestic and external sovereign defaults, I find that these costs ex-
plain a significant part of the variation in the sovereign risk spread across markets. This 
finding is robust to a multitude of tests and the inclusion of additional yield spread influ-
ences such as differences in macroeconomic fluctuations, portfolio allocation opportuni-
ties, local risk aversion and microstructure institutions. 
 
Altogether, this study is one of the first that provides an empirical backing to the recent 
sovereign debt literature of, e.g., Drazen (1998) and Reinhart et al. (2003), emphasizing 
the distinction between domestic and external government debt and that sovereigns strate-
gically choose on which of these to default depending on what political and economic 
costs that would give rise to. 
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Table 1: Danish and Swedish bond market microstructure around World War II  
  Copenhagen/Denmark Stockholm/Sweden 
Bond market facts:    
Main venue  Copenhagen Stock Exchange  Stockholm Stock Exchange 
Number and types of 
bonds listed 
≈250 bonds, 20 governmental. All 
domestic and DKK-denominated. 
≈60 bonds, 15 governmental, 10 foreign. 
All SEK-denominated. 
Reporting frequency  Daily  Biweekly (domestic), weekly (foreign) 
Monthly average 
trading volume on 
Exchange, 1938–
1948. 
All bonds: 470 million DKK (DKKm) 
All stocks: 62 DKKm 
Danish government bond in the study: 
0.14 DKKm (≈ 0.03% of total bond 
trading) 
All bonds: 164 million SEK (SEKm) 
All stocks: 205 SEKm 
Danish government bond in the study: 




tal (OTC + Ex-
change), 1926, 
1948–1952. 
No information on OTC volumes.  1926: 179.1 SEKm, of which OTC 134.1 
SEKm (75%) and Exchange 45 SEKm 
(25%). 
1948: 1,714 SEKm, of which OTC 1,356 
SEKm (79%) and Exchange 358 
SEKm (21%). 
1949–1952 (average): 7,421.1 SEKm, 
with OTC 6,934.4 SEKm (93%) and 
Exchange 486.7 SEKm (7%). 
Rules and regulations:    
Price limits  1. 9/1/39–9/22/39: Min. 2% below 
prices of 8/31/39. 
2. 9/23/39–2/23/46: ≥ –1% per day. 
9/1/39–1/2/40: ≥ –5% (in practice down 
to –10%) per day. 
Trading halts  1. 9/1/39–9/11/39 
2. 4/9/40–5/27/40 
3. 5/8/45–5/18/45 
No trading halts. 
Capital controls  Currency transfers restricted from Jan. 
1940. Capital in- and outflows 
stopped from Apr. 1940. 
All capital and currency in- and outflows 
without approval of the Bank of Swe-
den stopped from Feb. 1940. 
Sources: For Copenhagen: data on issues come from stock exchange price lists published in Finanstidende; 
trading volumes come from Statistics Denmark and the daily data of the study; rules and regulations are col-
lected from articles in Finanstidende, 10 Apr. 1940, p. 589. For Stockholm: data on issues come from stock 
exchange price lists; trading volumes come from the stock exchange and a newly collected sample of trading 
in foreign bonds on the exchange collected every third month during 1938–1948; OTC data for Jan.-Jun. 
1926 come from a Banking Inspection survey published in a government proposal (Prop. 1927:56 p. 13) and 
for 1948 onwards from the Banking Inspection recurrent official publication Uppgifter om bankerna samt 
uppgifter om fondkommissionärerna och fondbörs; rules and regulation data come from Algott (1962) and 
Valutakommittén (1980), SOU 1980:51, ch. 1. 
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Table 2: Explaining the yield differentials across markets, 1938–1948. 
















High  High 1    Denmark had no past defaults and integrated capital markets made it 
impossible to discriminate between bondholder nationalities, which 





High Med >1  +  Event: Outbreak of World War II (Sept. 1, 1939). The war reduced 
external default costs, partly since reputational costs are lower for 
wartime defaults and partly as historians report how the Danish gov-
ernment disliked a Swedish refusal in the early 1940 to assist Den-
mark in case of war. Domestic default costs remained high as con-
temporary sources report that the Danish people were aware of the 




High Low >>1  +  Event: German occupation (April 9, 1940). Despite the occupation, 
historians report that the Danish government remained in place to 
govern local politics and fiscal matters and that the German occu-
pant, wanting undisrupted trade flows and small occupation costs, 
wanted the support and compliance of the Danish people. Swedish 
creditors felt considerably more worried and seem to have expected 




Med Low >1  –  Event: Germany dissolves the Danish government and introduces 
martial law (Aug. 29, 1943). Germany takes political and fiscal con-
trol over Denmark, which clearly signals a reduced concern about the 
Danish people and reduced costs of a domestic default. The cost of 




High High 1  –  Event: Peace (May 8, 1945). Back to pre-war Scandinavian relations.
Note: CE and CD denote costs of external debt default, CD = cost of a domestic debt default. The periodiza-
tion largely relies on the historical descriptions of Johansen (1968, ch. 4–6) and Lidegaard (2005).   20
Table 3: Sovereign spreads and relative default costs, 1938–1948. 
Dependent 
variable: 
  NomSpreadED  RealSpreadED 




















































    
NomIntDiff   0.180 
(0.545) 
        
NomMarkDiff    0.012 
(0.026) 
        






















n (inflation)       12 (120,252) 12 (120,252)
# obs.    129  132  129  129  132  132 
F-statistic   71.0 33.8  459.2  102.3 60.0 53.9 
R
2   0.87  0.75  0.96  0.87  0.56  0.75 
Note: Dependent variables are nominal (NomSpreadED) and real (NomSpreadED) spreads between Danish 
long-term external and domestic government bonds based on market prices in Stockholm and Copenhagen. T 
denotes time dummies following Table 2, ExpDepr = st+n – st is the ex post rate of depreciation between 
Danish and Swedish currencies (s = SEK/DKK), NomIntDiff and RealIntDiff are the nominal and real differ-
entials between Swedish and Danish central bank discount rates, and NomMarkDiff and RealMarkDiff the 
same for stock market returns. n is the inflation horizon in numbers of months, either 12 (annual) or between 
120 and 252 (10–21 years) as described in Section 4. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-, 
5%- and 10%-levels, respectively. Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors with maximum 6 lags are in parentheses.   21
Table 4: Risk aversion of Danish and Swedish bond investors, 1938–1948. 
Returns concept:  Sovereign yields  Holding period returns   
Period (k),  
Market (i)  CAPM  αik  βik  Pr.>F  αik  βik  Pr.>F Obs.
k = Full  
(1938:1-1948:12) 
           




































k = Prewar  
(1938:1-1939:8) 
          




































k = War  
(1939:9-1945:5) 
          




































k = Postwar 
(1945:5-1948:12) 
          




































Note: Huber-Biweight robust CAPM regressions (6a) and (6b) with bootstrapped standard errors (with 2000 
replications) for all sub-periods. Dependent variable is excess return (either sovereign yields or holding pe-
riod returns) on Danish sovereign debt over the risk-free rate. “Local” and “Scandinavian” CAPM refer to 
the use of either a local portfolio or an equally-weighted Copenhagen-Stockholm portfolio. Subscript i is 
market place and k is periods “Full”, “Prewar”, “War” and “Postwar”. 
a, 
b and 
c denote significance at the 
1%-, 5%- and 10%-levels, respectively.    22











































US capital to Sweden 
Swedish capital to USA 
British capital to Sweden
Swedish capital to Britain
Danish capital to Sweden 
Swedish capital to Denmark
 
Notes and sources: “Swedish financial intermediaries” are the 40-50 commercial banks and stock brokers 
reporting to the Swedish Banking Inspection. The source is the Banking Inspection’s “Bankbolags 






































Sources: See text. 
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Figure 3: Returns on the risk-free rate and stock market portfolio in Copenhagen 








1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948
Market return, Copenhagen Market return, Stockholm
Risk-free rate, Denmark Risk-free rate, Sweden
 
Notes: Market portfolio returns are nominal capital gains on the composite stock price indexes recorded on 
the Copenhagen and Stockholm Stock Exchanges. Risk-free rates are the discount rates of each country’s 
central bank. For sources, see text. 
 
 



























































Danish inflation (n=12) Swedish inflation (n>119)
Danish inflation (n>119) Swedish inflation (n=12)
Exchange rate
 
Sources: See text.  24
Figure 5: Daily prices and volumes at the Copenhagen Stock Exchange, 1939–1940. 
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Source: Daily market reports in the newspaper Berlingske Tidende. 
 